India’s Air Power Paradox: Modern Defenses, Diminishing Teeth

 

India’s Air Power Paradox: Modern Defenses, Diminishing Teeth

By Anupam Srivastava

While Operation Sindoor in May 2025 was hailed as a tactical masterstroke showcasing India’s multi-layered air defense grid, it has also cast a stark spotlight on the growing imbalance between India's air defense capabilities and its fast-eroding offensive airpower. Behind the façade of missile shields and drone intercepts lies a force stretched dangerously thin.

Squadron Crisis: The Numbers Don't Lie

The Indian Air Force today operates just 31 fighter squadrons, significantly below the sanctioned strength of 42. But even this benchmark is seen by many defense planners as a compromise—what India truly needs, given its volatile borders with Pakistan, China, and a rapidly militarizing Bangladesh, is more than a 72-squadron force.

The drawdown has been years in the making. The retirement of legacy platforms like the MiG-21, MiG-23BN, and Jaguars has not been matched by commensurate inductions. Indigenous efforts, notably the HAL Tejas Mk1A, have been sluggish despite recent ramp-ups, while the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) global tender for 114 fighters remains stalled—still at the RFI/RFP stage five years after inception.

“India is preparing for 21st-century warfare with 20th-century force levels and 19th century mindset of leaders,” said one retired Air Marshal.

Operation Sindoor: Air Defense in Action

The May 2025 border incursion scenario in the western sector saw India’s integrated air defense network, for the first time, operate at scale:

The S-400 Triumf, with three batteries currently active, provided deep-range aerial denial.

Akashteer, India’s automated command-and-control network, coordinated multi-layer radar feeds and interception assets seamlessly.

SAMAR, a low-cost innovation that repurposes old air-to-air missiles into surface-based interceptors, neutralized a wave of loitering munitions.

The outcome: zero enemy aerial penetrations, and no need to scramble manned jets.

It was a modern air defense victory—on paper. But it also reinforced a dangerous pattern: India is leaning increasingly on static defenses, rather than projecting air power forward.

Air Defense is Not Air Superiority

While air defense systems can protect key nodes, they cannot establish air dominance, conduct deep strikes, or neutralize strategic enemy infrastructure. Only combat aircraft can execute those missions.

The reliance on surface-based systems creates a defensive posture by default, reducing the IAF’s ability to shape events across the Line of Control or the Line of Actual Control.

Gaps in Force Modernization

Despite public rhetoric, India’s modernization track record remains sluggish and scattered:

Fighter Fleet Replenishment

Tejas Mk1A: 83 ordered; GE to supply 2 engines per month. Still, the full fleet won’t be operational before 2028.

Tejas Mk2: First flight delayed to late 2026; production may not begin until 2030.

AMCA (Fifth-Gen Jet): Cleared for development; first prototype by 2028, earliest induction not expected before 2035.

MRFA Tender: Still pending government approval; major vendors await clarity. Government still confused.

Su-30MKI Upgrade: Approved Rs63,000 crore program will include AESA radars (Virupaksha), avionics, and weapons integration—full rollout unlikely before 2030.

Drone & Surveillance Edge

Heron-TP & Loitering Munitions: Procurements underway, but indigenous capability still catching up.

AEW&C Fleet: Only 3 Netra platforms operational; 6 Netra Mk2 aircraft in development.

Radars: 18 Ashwini radar systems recently deployed—but inadequate for pan-India coverage.

The Strategic Limits of Defence

While these systems provide excellent point and area defence, they do not replace the strategic functions of a fighter aircraft. Air superiority is achieved not by denying airspace alone, but by dominating it—proactively and persistently. Only a robust fighter fleet can undertake:

Deep interdiction and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD/DEAD)

Offensive counter-air (OCA) missions

Close air support for ground forces

Strategic reconnaissance and ISR operations

Precision long-range strike

Air defence systems, no matter how advanced, are inherently reactive in nature. They protect but do not project. They deter but do not dominate.

Strategic Inertia or Misplaced Priorities?

India’s defense leadership has long prioritized surface forces, largely due to political optics and internal security pressures. The Indian Army accounts for nearly 55% of defense expenditure, while the IAF’s share remains below 23%.

This imbalance is stark for a country that faces simultaneous aerial threats from both China and Pakistan, with no true alliance structure to rely on in wartime. But now if you consider Bangladesh as another possible front then the threat becomes more serious. 

“The Indian Air Force is expected to punch above its weight, but it’s flying with one hand tied behind its back,” says a senior IAF planner.

What’s Needed: A Twin-Thrust Doctrine

To maintain strategic parity in the region, India must urgently pursue a dual-front modernization strategy:

1. Expand Fighter Fleet to at least 42 Squadrons by 2030

This requires fast-tracked production, AMCA prioritization, and political will to execute the MRFA tender without further delays.

2. Develop Autonomous Aerial Power

Armed drones, swarms, and AI-enabled loitering munitions must be operationalized by mid-decade. The DRDO Netra, CATS Warrior, and TAPAS-BH drones cannot remain prototypes indefinitely.

3. Invest in Strategic Lift and Refueling

Mid-air refueling and rapid troop deployment platforms like the C-295, IL-78, and new tankers are essential for long-range operations.

They are required in more numbers. 

4. Integrate Air Defense with Offensive Doctrine

While systems like Akashteer provide robust C2 capabilities, they must work in tandem with manned and unmanned strike platforms—not substitute them.

Political Will vs Strategic Requirement

While India’s defense budget continues to grow in absolute terms, its allocation is heavily skewed toward personnel and legacy commitments. The IAF’s share, often under 23% of the total defence expenditure, remains inadequate for a capital-intensive force tasked with maintaining regional air dominance.

The broader strategic community has voiced concern that airpower, despite being decisive in modern conflict, does not receive the institutional prioritization it deserves.

As former Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria once remarked:

“Air superiority is not a luxury—it’s a prerequisite.”

 The Sword Must Return

India’s current reliance on missile-based air defense, while tactically sound, is not a viable replacement for a shrinking fighter fleet. Deterrence is not built on denial systems—it is built on dominance.

As Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh pointed out earlier this year: “You don’t win wars with walls. You win them by flying over them.”

India must heed this warning. A force with only 31 squadrons cannot fulfill the ambitions—or the obligations—of a rising power. It is time for New Delhi to stop admiring its shields, and start sharpening its sword.

Anupam Srivastava is a Special Correspondent with Hindustan Times for last 25 years, with special interest in defence writing and reviews. 

Sources:

MoD Briefings, 2025

HAL & DRDO Public Statements

Janes World Air Forces Database, 2025

Indian Parliamentary Defence Committee Reports